What has been the quantitative effect on productivity growth of information and communication technology (ICT) in Europe after 1995? Based on a multi-country sectoral panel data set, we provide econometric evidence of positive and significant productivity effects of ICT in Europe, mainly due to advances in total factor productivity. In contrast to the US, this impact of ICT has happened against a negative macro economic shock not related to ICT. Our main result is in contrast to the established consensus in the growth accounting literature that there has been no acceleration of productivity growth in Europe, mainly due to the performance of ICT-using sectors. One important advantage of using econometric methods is that we can distinguish between growth effects from ICT and macro economic shocks; a feature that growth accounting methods cannot handle.
Introduction
This paper provides new econometric evidence on the relationship between information and communication technology (ICT) and productivity growth in Europe. We …nd that ICT-intensive industries went through a far less dramatic reduction in productivity growth after 1995 than industries which did not use ICT intensively in production. In e¤ect, the overall slow-down in productivity growth that happened in Europe after 1995, would have been even more dramatic in the absence of any positive impact of ICT. This result is contrary to the general consensus reached in the growth accounting literature as recently summarized by Draca, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2006) : "There has been no acceleration of productivity growth in the EU, mainly due to the performance of the ICT using sectors." 1 Whereas our econometric …ndings con…rm the …rst part of this statement, we …nd signi…cant e¤ects of ICT, including a positive e¤ect on productivity growth among ICT users.
Two important di¤erences in terms of productivity developments between Europe and the United States stand out in the literature. First, a productivity gap between Europe and the United States developed over the second half of the 1990s because the aggregate productivity levels of the two regions diverged. For example, Van Ark, O'Mahony, and Timmer (2008) …nd that the US productivity growth rate increased from 1.5 per cent before 1995 to 3 per cent after 1995, whereas the productivity growth rate in Europe declined from 2.4 per cent to 1.5 per cent. Ark (2003) found that although European ICT-producing sectors experienced a productivity acceleration similar to that of US ICT-producers, ICT-using sectors failed to achieve a similar development in Europe. However, the fact that ICT-using industries in Europe showed stagnant productivity does not in itself preclude a positive di¤erential impact of ICT. In order to identify the impact of ICT use, the performance of ICT users will have to be compared to the aggregate scenario of declining productivity growth in Europe during the 1990s.
Second, O'Mahony and Van
Our main hypothesis is based on these observations. We test if ICT had a positive di¤erential impact on productivity growth in the sense that ICT-intensive industries had signi…cantly higher productivity growth rates than non-ICT-intensive industries after 1995. To properly address this question it is crucial to distinguish aggregate macro e¤ects from sectoral e¤ects generated by differences in the use of ICT. Therefore, we apply econometric methods that control separately for macro e¤ects, sector-speci…c …xed e¤ects, and the e¤ects from ICT-use.
The applied data source is the industry data from the EUKLEMS database. 2 This dataset comprises a large set of internationally comparable data on productivity developments at a disaggregated sectoral level. The database also contains detailed data on capital investments, including ICT related capital expenditures. We exploit the panel structure of the country and industry data to control for unobserved industry-speci…c and country-speci…c …xed e¤ects as well as time e¤ects.
This allows us to identify the productivity e¤ects of ICT within industries and, therefore, separately from productivity e¤ects generated by changes in the business structure.
Our use of econometric methods has some advantages over the growth accounting framework usually employed in the literature on productivity growth determinants. 3 The econometric methods quantify the impact of ICT by exploiting the variation in industry-level data. Moreover, they allow statistical tests of signi…cance of the economic impact of ICT. In contrast, the growth-accounting method basically assumes the result since factor shares are used as measures for output elasticities.
Moreover, the growth accounting methods decompose labor productivity growth into contributions from labor composition, capital deepening, and multifactor productivity. The latter component is a residual measure with multiple interpretations; it can be a measure of technological progress but could also pick up widespread macroeconomic shocks. In other words, it is not possible to distinguish between e¤ects on productivity from new technology, e.g., ICT, and macro economic e¤ects, e.g., e¤ects of labor market reforms, changes in competition, regulation, etc.
Our main …ndings are that the decline in labor productivity growth after 1995 is a general phenomenon across European industries but sectoral productivity growth rates decreased the most in non-ICT-intensive industries. More speci…cally, the average decline in sectoral growth rates of non ICT-intensive industries was around 1 percentage point for labor productivity growth after 1995. This was partly countervailed by a positive e¤ect of around 0.8 percentage points in industries that were ICT-intensive pre-1995. Our results weaken when ICT-producers are excluded although an economically signi…cant di¤erential e¤ect of 0.5 percentage points remains for ICT-users versus remaining sectors. The result does not depend critically on the developments in …nancial intermediation (FIRE) industries nor the exact timing of the break.
In addition to providing results on labor productivity in a comparable multi-country setting, a main contribution of our paper is to extend the analysis to total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
The extension is crucial in order to distinguish genuine e¤ects of technological progress due to ICT 2 See www.euklems.net or Van Ark et al. (2008) . 3 See below in Section 2 for a summary of this literature from the capital-deepening e¤ects of increasing the amounts of ICT capital used in production in di¤erent sectors.
Our results show that the average growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) fell by 0.6-0.7 percentage points after 1995 in non ICT-intensive sectors. In ICT intensive industries, there was a countervailing positive growth e¤ect of 0.6 percentage points. The result does not depend critically on developments in ICT-producing industries, FIRE industries, nor the exact timing of the break. Hence, we …nd evidence that that higher ICT intensity has contributed positively to TFP productivity growth in Europe, including an economically sizable and statistically signi…cant TFP gain in intensively ICT-using industries. Moreover, a comparison of TFP and labor productivity impacts of ICT shows that the impact of ICT in Europe is predominantly due to gains in TFP rather than capital deepening.
The basic set-up of our analysis is closely related to Stiroh (2002) . He analyzed the relationship between ICT intensity and labor productivity growth across industries for the United States. A comparison with Stiroh's results will thus enable us to quantitatively assess whether the US is ahead of Europe in terms of productive applications of ICT. This turns out to be the case since Stiroh found a larger di¤erences in terms of post-1995 labor productivity growth between ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive industries. His point estimate suggests almost 2 percentage points higher growth rate of labor productivity compared to other industries for the US economy. The overall conclusion is that there has been signi…cant e¤ects of ICT in European economies but that the e¤ects have been around half of the ICT e¤ects experienced in the United States when looking at labor productivity growth.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the literature on ICT and productivity growth at the sectoral level. Section 3 documents the basic descriptive facts about the aggregate growth scenario, the development of certain sectors, and the timing of a break in productivity in Europe during the 1990's. Section 4 provides a detailed account of the EUKLEMS data on which our analysis is based while section 5 summarizes our econometric approach. Our empirical results are reported in Section 6, whereas Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The literature on the possible impact of ICT on productivity growth took o¤ from the so-called Solow paradox, the observation by Solow (1987) that although enormous technological progress in ICT production had been realized and gone along with strong investments in ICT, hardly any e¤ect on economic growth could be observed. Subsequent studies on ICT and productivity growth in the macro literature have mostly been performed for the United States using the growth-accounting framework. For an introduction to the growth accounting methodology, see Jorgenson et al (1987) .
The studies …nd that productivity growth has accelerated after 1995 and a consensus has been established that this acceleration is linked to ICT. 4 The growth-accounting method decomposes labor productivity growth into growth in labor input, growth contributions by capital deepening, and growth in TFP. In order to assess the magnitude of the direct e¤ects of ICT on growth, two additional steps are taken. First, to measure the contribution from the use of ICT capital, the growth in capital input is decomposed into two elements, one related to ICT capital and one related to other capital goods. Second, to single out the contribution from technological progress in the production of ICT capital, the private sector is decomposed into ICT-producing industries and ICT-using industries. The technological progress in the production of ICT is then measured by the TFP growth in the former industries. Using this method, Oliner and Sichel (2000) …nd that the growth rate in labor productivity increased by 1.04 percentage points from 1991-95 to 1996-99 for the US. Of this increase 43 per cent can be attributed to the accumulation of ICT capital in all industries, whereas 36 per cent can be attributed to TFP growth in ICT-producing sectors. The method also provides a measure of TFP growth, however, this measure cannot be linked directly to ICT, though it may re ‡ect that ICT-using sectors have higher productivity partly as a result of higher ICT use.
Using industry data, Stiroh (2002) produces econometric evidence that there was signi…cant productivity growth in the ICT-using sectors, even after controlling for macro economic shocks.
The analysis is performed for US industries for the periods 1987-95 and 1995-2000. 5 The main …ndings are that the acceleration in productivity is a broad phenomenon across US industriesnot only in ICT-producing sectors -but that growth rates increased the most in ICT-intensive industries. More speci…cally, ICT-intensive industries experienced a productivity acceleration about 2 percentage points greater than other industries. The results are developed for labor productivity growth. It remains unclear whether e¤ects from ICT are generated through capital deepening or TFP. 6 Some growth-accounting studies have also appeared for European economies. Contrary to the United States, European productivity growth did not accelerate after 1995; instead aggregate labor productivity growth declined. In other words, the productivity gap betwen Europe and the United that "the European productivity slowdown is attributable to the slower emergence of the knowledge economy in Europe compared to the United States". 7 
European productivity developments in the 1990s
Europe enjoyed a much less favourable productivity trend than the US after 1995. Table 1 details the labor productivity developments in eight European countries using the US for comparison. The table contains the unweighted average of labor productivity growth rates over industries for the preand post-1995 periods for the nonfarm business sector, and the nonfarm business sector excluding ICT producers or FIRE industries, respectively. The included European economies are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
[ Table 1 about here]
It is evident that the average industry growth rates either decreased or increased only slightly in Europe post-1995 with the only exception of Austria that experienced an increasing growth rate of 0.7 percentage points. When excluding ICT production it is found that the average growth rates fell in all European economies except in Austria that experienced an increase of around half a percentage point. In contrast to the European economies, the average industry growth rate in the United States more than doubled post-1995.
While the rate of productivity growth was generally very modest in Europe compared to the US, there was also some degree of dispersion in productivity growth rates across European countries. In order to be able to measure any di¤erential productivity impact in relatively ICT-intensive sectors, we will have to take into account that such di¤erences happened against a much weaker general productivity trend than in the US. Although the dividing line of 1995 has been accepted for Europe as well, this tradition is not based on any statistical tests; according to our knowledge, no such statistical test of break year for European productivity exists. Empirically, the date of any break is less easily determined for individual European countries than for the US because the available data are annual. By having a set of comparable panel data, we can pool the data across countries. The cost that we have to cover when pooling is an assumption that the break happens simultaneously across all countries. The test presented in Figure 1 applies the Sup F test of Andrews (1993) to a pooled data set containing the nonfarm business sector industries across eight European countries. 8 [ Figure 1 about here]
Details on the applied model is presented in Section 5 below. The dotted curve shows the average for all eight countries of Sup F tests calculated for each potential break year. We also calculate the test excluding data for Austria (the dashed line). This country turns out to be non-poolable with the remaining countries, see Section 6 below. Overall, by pooling the evidence across countries, we …nd that the econometric evidence on the timing of the break is consistent with the ICT-induced break in the US during 1995 that was established by Stiroh (2002) . In conclusion, we will follow existing literature in allowing for a break in productivity in 1995. We present further evidence on the robustness of our results as to the timing of the break in Section 6.
Data and Variables
The applied data source is the EUKLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. 9 This database include data on gross output, value added, ICT capital, other capital, hours worked, employment, and intermediate inputs at the industry level, implying that analyses of the relationship between productivity growth and ICT can be carried out for both labor productivity and total factor productivity. The database comprises data for the period 1970 to 2004. In the following we discuss key variables used in the empirical analysis below. 8 We do not report any critical value since a panel data version of the Sup F test has not been worked out in the literature. 9 See www.EUKLEMS.net.
Productivity growth
We apply two measures of productivity growth. The …rst measure is based on labor productivity that is simply de…ned as output divided by labor input, whereas total factor productivity relates output to a composite of primary factor inputs and intermediate inputs.
The applied measure of output is sectoral gross output. This measure is superior to sectoral value added because an output measure based on a real value-added function is justi…ed only when the production function of gross output is separable in real value-added and intermediate inputs.
Jorgenson, Fraumani, and Galop (1987) …nd that separability is heavily rejected.
We follow the standard in the literature and measure labor productivity as output in relation to the total hours worked. When estimating TFP we measure factor inputs as labor service where labor types with high relative wages weight more than labor types with low relative wages in a sectoral measure of labor input. Capital service is used as the measure of capital input. 
ICT intensity
The main measure of ICT-intensity is de…ned as ICT-capital service out of total capital service.
Moreover, we apply two alternative measures of ICT-intensity; ICT-capital service per worked hour and ICT-capital service in relation to gross output. These de…nitions follows Stiroh (2002) .
The main analysis is based on dummy variables de…ned using the main measure of ICT-intensity.
If the ICT-intensity for an industry exceeds the country median value over industries, the dummy equals 1, whereas it equals 0 otherwise. In the robustness analysis, the empirical results are checked by using dummy variables based on two alternative measures of ICT-intensity. The regression analyses are also performed using the continuous measure of ICT intensity.
Countries and Industry Coverage
Data are provided for 31 industries in the EUKLEMS database. Of these we exclude agriculture, hunting, forestry and …shing as well as mining and quarrying. Moreover, we exclude 4 industries within non-market services and the personal service sector private households with employed persons. We are left with 24 industries within the nonfarm business sector on which the analysis is based. 10 Throughout the analysis we distinguish between ICT-producing and -using industries. Stiroh (2002) found that although productivity growth in the US increased signi…cantly in all ICT intensive industries, the e¤ects were found to be stronger among ICT producers. We follow Van Ark et al.
(2007) and de…ne ICT producers as the ICT-producing manufacturing and service sectors. 11 For the purpose of the present analysis, we use data for 8 European countries. These are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom. 12 
Econometric Approach
We specify a di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression in terms of the log growth rate of labor productivity,
Here Y ijt denotes real gross output of industry i in country j in year t and likewise for the number of hours worked, E ijt .
where " ijt is an error term and ICT-intensity in the break year 1995 in industry j of country i is denoted it ij95 . We will consider two di¤erent speci…cations of this term: A binary term that equals one if the ICT intensity of a particular industry is above the median (and zero otherwise) and a continuous speci…cation that simply includes the intensity variable itself. Using a binary classi…cation based on the median provides robustness to outlying measurements.
We exploit the fact that we have a panel of consistent data across a number of European countries to approach the estimation of (1) at several di¤erent levels of generality. First, as a starting point to check the actual poolability of the data across countries, we consider country-bycountry analyses that allow full ‡exibility in terms of all parameters, including the slopes. Second, when pooling the data across countries we can allow for di¤erent …xed e¤ects across countries A second main extension compared to Stiroh (2002) is the analysis of total factor productivity.
For this we specify a di¤-in-di¤ regression in terms of the growth rate of real output:
The TFP regression furthermore includes controls for the growth rates of intermediate inputs
, labor ( ln L ijt ) and capital ( ln K ijt ), and an error term (u ijt ).
Empirical Results

Labor productivity
This section reports our results based on (1) for labor productivity growth. For each country we divide industries into ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive industries depending on their ICT intensities in comparison to the median intensity. In Section 6.3 below, we provide results based on two alternative measures and a continuous speci…cations of ICT intensity.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 The estimates of the coe¢ cients related to the trend-break term, d, and its interaction term with ICT-intensity, d it, are of main interest. They remain fairly stable across speci…cations.
The most general speci…cation (panel C) is preferred because it encompasses the fact that lagged productivity growth enters very signi…cantly in some countries and because we can control for any unobserved time-invariant level di¤erences between industries by including industry …xed e¤ects.
The point estimates suggest that seven out of eight countries experienced negative changes in productivity growth rates in 1995 for non-ICT-intensive industries (the coe¢ cient of d). This is consistent with a decrease in the aggregate productivity growth rate in Europe after 1995 as found in the literature. Moreover, since the present analysis is carried out on industry data, it shows that productivity growth falls on average within industries meaning that the trend break cannot be (fully) attributed to changing business structure With respect to the interaction term d it, six countries have positive point estimates. This pattern of e¤ects is consistent with a positive impact of ICT after 1995 against an overall negative change in productivity growth. In this sense, the results suggest that ICT has a¤ected productivity growth positively after all.
Comparing across European countries, there is an apparent dispersion of point estimates. Moreover, the standard errors of single country estimates are also fairly large and we …nd that many individual country estimates remain insigni…cant. In order to reduce the uncertainty of point estimates, we pool the data over European countries. The cost of doing this is that we have to assume that production functions are equal across countries and industries apart from country/industry …xed e¤ects.
Results for Austria are seen to di¤er substantially from the overall pattern of a negative break and a positive interaction term. We conclude that Austria is too di¤erent to be included in an overall European panel data set. 13 Crucially, we note that our basic conclusion about the timing of the productivity trend break from Section 2 is left unaltered when Austria is excluded from the panel. This can be seen by comparison of the dotted and dashed curves in Figure 1 . Therefore, we can still use 1995 as the break year when combining the data into a panel of seven European
countries (EU-7).
The results of the EU-7 panel data regressions are reported in Table 3 . Results under the heading "All industries" apply to the full set of 24 industries. They di¤er according to the type of …xed e¤ects allowed: "Pooled" excludes …xed e¤ects altogether and imposes a common constant term across countries and industries; "FE Country" allows intercepts to vary across country (but not across industry); "FE Industry"allows intercepts to vary across industry (but not across country);
and "FE General" allows a full set of industry/country speci…c intercepts. In the latter case, the coe¢ cient of 1995-ICT intensity (it) is not identi…ed due to its time-invariance.
[ Table 3 about here]
There is evidence of an overall negative change of about one percentage point in the rate of labor productivity growth in non-ICT-intensive industries after 1995; a negative and signi…cant coe¢ - The results are consistent in terms of sign and magnitude both across methods and with the average results for individual countries in Table 2 . In the panel results, we …nd that the coe¢ cients to the break dummy equals -1.10 and .90 to the interaction term, whereas the single country regressions lead to average coe¢ cients of -1.14 and .80, respectively. 14 The fact that our panel estimates remain very close to the average of country-speci…c results supports the poolability of the seven countries in the panel.
The remaining results in Table 3 are obtained by excluding certain industries from the panel. 15 Excluding the ICT-producing industries (ICT hardware production and telecommunications) we …nd that the interaction term becomes less signi…cant. 16 The …nding of a smaller e¤ect when excluding ICT-producers is consistent with Stiroh's results for the US. The marginal loss of signi…cance is in keeping with the fact that overall e¤ects for the European case are less signi…cant.
Looking into the importance of individual ICT-producing industries we …nd that the lower level of signi…cance is primarily driven by the exclusion of telecommunications. The …nal set of results in Table 3 exclude FIRE industries. There is little change in the coe¢ cient of the interaction term. 1 4 The mean country results (excluding Austria) from Table 1 are .057 for the coe¢ cient of lnA 1, -1.136 for d, and .801 for d it. 1 5 As results have been found to remain very stable across methods, we report only the most general …xed e¤ects speci…cation. 1 6 The coe¢ cient estimate is borderline insigni…cant at the ten per cent level.
In qualitative terms, our main results remain unaltered by excluding FIRE. This is consistent with Stiroh's (2002) …ndings for the US.
In Figure 2 we address our initial choice of 1995 as the break year. The …gure shows the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term between break-year ICT-intensity, it, and the corresponding break dummy, d, when the potential break year is varied between 1990 and 1999. It also depicts the approximate 95 per cent con…dence bands. 17 The magnitude of the break in the trend of labor productivity seems fairly robust to the choice of a di¤erent break year around the middle of the 1990s.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In conclusion, we …nd that European industries, which are relatively ICT-intensive pre-1995 outperform remaining industries post-1995 in terms of labor productivity growth. In contrast to the US, the change happened against a bleak overall European productivity growth scenario.
Our results become weaker when ICT-producers are excluded although an economically signi…cant di¤erential e¤ect of 0.5 percentage points remains for ICT-users versus remaining sectors. The result does not depend critically on the developments in FIRE industries nor the exact timing of the break.
It is of interest to compare the magnitude of e¤ects to existing results for the United States.
Stiroh (2002) …nds an interaction term of two per cent for the United States, implying that the interaction term for European economies is around half the size. This result is consistent with the single country regressions in the sense that the e¤ect of ICT in Europe is less noticable that in the United States, which resulted in imprecise point estimates. Thus, ICT has an positive e¤ect on productivity growth in Europe, however, it is only half the size of the United States. In this sense, the di¤erence in the utilization of ICT between the two regions has partially lead the divergence in productivity levels, but it does not explain the fall in European productivity growth after 1995.
Total Factor Productivity
We next turn to total factor productivity growth. The importance of this analysis is that it enables us to study if the relationship between ICT and labor productivity growth is mainly due to capitaldeepening or whether advances in ICT technology also in ‡uence productivity growth. We employ the extended di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression (2) in decomposing the growth rate of real output.
Industries are divided into ICT-intensive and ICT-extensive sectors as above. The basic di¤-in-di¤ regression is augmented by terms to capture the growth rates of input in terms of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs.
[ Table 4 about here]
The importance of the post-1995 productivity slowdown in ICT-extensive sectors reduces to approximately .6 percentage points as compared to the fall of about one percentage point in the rate of growth of labor productivity. This suggests that part of the fall in labor productivity around 1995 is due to reduced accumulation of physical capital and intermediate inputs.
As for the case of labor productivity, the ICT-intensive sectors signi…cantly outperform the remaining sectors post-1995. The size of the di¤erential TFP gain in ICT-intensive industries (the coe¢ cient of d it) is marginally reduced to .6 percentage points from the .8 percentage gain in labor productivity. Again, this reduction is due to the fact that we take factor accumulation into account. The negative overall TFP trend break is now completely counterweighted by the positive interaction term for the ICT-intensive industries.
We address the robustness of our main TFP results in the same directions as above. First, in Figure 3 we repeat the exercise of changing the break year. A very similar picture emerges although the overall level of signi…cance is somewhat reduced compared to the results on labor productivity.
Second, Table 4 shows that the total factor productivity di¤erential does not depend on the presence of ICT-producing industries nor on developments in the FIRE industries. Signi…cant e¤ects remain when excluding either of these sectors.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Overall, our TFP extension of the analysis yields three main conclusions. First, there are signi…cant TFP gains from ICT in Europe post-1995. Secondly, a comparison of TFP and labor productivity impacts of ICT shows that most of the impact of ICT in Europe is indeed due to gains in TFP rather than capital deepening; a result that is di¤erent from the experience in the United
States. Third, we …nd economically sizable and statistically signi…cant TFP gains for intensively ICT-using industries.
An interesting observation of the analyses is the growth e¤ect for intensively ICT-using industries. Under the study of labor productivity growth, a positive but statistically insigni…cant di¤erence is found between ICT-intensive and non-ICT-intensive industries, whereas the e¤ect is positive and statistically signi…cant under TFP growth. Thus, there is a strong acceleration in TFP growth in ICT using sectors, whereas it is less pronounced for labor productivity growth. This suggests the European economies, in addition to increasing TFP growth, experienced a reduction in capital deepening which is especially pronounced for ICT-intensive industries.
Continuous and alternative ICT intensity measures
In this section we further address the robustness of our main results in dimensions related to the measurement of ICT intensity. First, instead of the binary classi…cation of ICT intensity in relation to the median industry intensity, we include the underlying measurements directly in order to more fully utilize the information in this variable. 18 Second, we apply several di¤erent possible measurements of ICT intensity. Note that the estimates of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term, d it cont are not directly comparable across de…nitions or with the main results based on the binary measure due to di¤erences in the normalizations of these variables.
[ Table 5 about here] Table 5 presents the results for labor productivity and TFP growth. The …rst column under the two growth measures presents the speci…cation of (1) and (2) with industry and country dummies, i.e., the FE general model. It is seen that the results established in Tables 3 and 4 The results show that our basic conclusion holds: Both labor productivity and TFP experienced a signi…cant di¤erential post-1995 gain in ICT intensive industries irrespective of the measure applied. 1 8 The continuous measures are normalized using country-speci…c means and standard deviations.
Discussion and Conclusion
We challenge the general consensus that states that there has been no acceleration of productivity growth in the EU, mainly due to lacking performance of the ICT using sectors during the second half of the 1990s. Instead we …nd signi…cant productivity gains, especially in TFP, from ICT in Secondly, a comparison of TFP and labor productivity impacts of ICT shows that most of the impact of ICT in Europe is indeed due to gains in TFP rather than capital deepening. Third, we …nd economically sizable and statistically signi…cant TFP gains for intensive ICT-users.
The ‡ip side of the positive ICT-e¤ects on productivity growth is that the overall European productivity growth is still bleak. Thus, aggregate as well as industry averages of productivity growth decreased in Europe after 1995. Our …ndings thus clear ICT-using industries from being the main cause of weak performance because of unexploited productivity gains from ICT. Rather, the aggregate economy experiences a negative macro economic shock that lead to deceleration of productivity growth.
There are two broader implications of the analysis presented in the present paper. First, why are e¤ects on productivity growth in Europe not as large not as large as in the United States?
This question can be divided into the study of why the ICT-capital-deepening e¤ect has been more extensive in the United States and the study of why US industries have been better to realize technology advances to productivity growth. The two e¤ects may of course be related.
Second, the underlying reason for the deceleration in European productivity development is still unresolved. Is the European slowdown generated by labor market reforms getting unskilled and possible less productive workers back into jobs? According to Bloom et al (2008) this may be part of the reason, but not all. 19 Other potential explanations should also be taken into consideration. 
